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UNITED STATES AVIATION SAFETY DATA: USES AND





T HE WORLDWIDE commercial aviation accident rate has re-
mained relatively constant during the past decade. For 40
years prior to this period, however, the global aviation industry
maintained a positive rate of improved safety. Innovations in
aircraft technologies and improved flight crew training pro-
grams are among the factors widely credited for this long-term
favorable trend; yet, more remains to be done. Even if the cur-
rent accident rate continues, it is inevitable that there will be a
larger number of accidents in the future if the industry's pre-
dicted growth in the international aviation fleet and expansion
of air service materializes.
Of course, many initiatives exist with the goal of reducing the
accident rate. For instance, the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security established a U.S. goal of reducing
the fatal accident rate by 80 percent in 10 years following the
1994-96 baseline.'
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www.faa.gov/about/plans-reports/performance/performancetargets/details/05
51_AirlineFatalAccidentRate.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
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The global aviation industry recognizes that future reductions
in commercial aircraft accidents will require knowledge sharing
systems and legislation that supports the collection and sharing
of airline safety information. A key strategy for sustained reduc-
tions in commercial aircraft accidents is to study contributing
factors that lead to human error. Airlines, government agencies,
and other professional organizations are pursuing strategies for
developing systems that reduce the potential of airline acci-
dents. In order to mitigate potential human error, the industry
needs "information on the day to day operational difficulties,
stresses and human failures that flight crew, cabin crew, air traf-
fic controllers, aircraft dispatchers and maintenance personnel
experience on every one of their working days."' 2 Improving air-
line safety by mitigation of human error requires the collection,
analysis, and use of data and information related to the day-to-
day operational difficulties experienced by the global airline in-
dustry. Therefore, many airlines, government agencies, and
other professional organizations are now advocating the devel-
opment of global aviation or airline safety data and information
sharing systems.
As a case in point, in 1997, the U.S. National Civil Aviation
Review Commission ("NCARC") encouraged the development
of voluntary aviation safety information sharing systems. 4 Ac-
cording to NCARC, these systems should collect, analyze, and
disseminate airline operational safety information to aviation
professionals, related industries, and the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).' NCARC also advised that trust is essen-
tial to these systems and that keeping information confidential is
necessary for the system's ability to acquire information.6 Safety
information sharing systems are likely to fail should disclosure
lead to punitive action, misrepresentation, revealed trade
secrets, or increased exposure to liability.
Aviation safety information sharing systems collect informa-
tion through voluntary reporting, electronic monitoring, or di-
2 Mike O'Leary, The British Airways Human Factors Reporting Programme, 75 RELI-
ABILITY ENGINEERING & SYSTEM SAFETY 245-55 (2002).
3 Marion C. Blakey, Remarks at the European Aviation Club (June 18, 2003),
available at http://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/speeches/blakey/2003/speeches
_blakey030618.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
4 NAT'L CIVIL AVIATION REVIEW COMM'N, AVOIDING AVIATION GRIDLOCK & RE-
DUCING THE ACCIDENT RATE (Dec. 1997), available at http://wwwl.faa.gov/
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rect observation.7 The NCARC, International Civil Aviation
Organization ("ICAO"), and various national government agen-
cies have initiated or endorsed policies and legislative actions
protecting aviation safety information from public disclosure
and use in punitive actions or litigation.'
Information sharing systems protected from access by govern-
ment agencies also provide a level of protection against national
public disclosure policies.9 ICAO, NCARC, and other stakehold-
ers in the international airline industry have endorsed non-puni-
tive aviation safety information sharing systems as a key strategy
for reducing the potential of airline accidents.' °
A recent initiative by ICAO exemplifies the emerging consen-
sus regarding the connection between receiving useful safety
data in exchange for confidentiality and protection against pu-
nitive actions. In 2003, ICAO's Eleventh Air Navigation Confer-
ence issued Recommendation 2/4, which addressed the
development of policy and national law supporting the protec-
tion of sources of safety information. The conference recom-
mended that ICAO establish guidelines that would "provide
support to States in adopting adequate measures of national law,
for the purpose of protecting the sources and free flow of safety
information, while taking into account the public interest in the
proper administration of justice."'1 Most aviation safety infor-
mation sharing systems in the world today collect voluntarily
submitted data and information; therefore, these systems strive
to protect the identity of their sources. Some national laws also
protect individual sources of voluntary aviation information
sharing systems from punitive actions. Exceptions to this protec-
tion include willful acts such as substance abuse, regulatory vio-
lations, and sabotage.
Irrespective of these policies and legal protections, ICAO
notes an increase in punitive actions taken against identified
sources to aviation safety information systems, especially those
safety data collection systems that rely on direct observation.
1 2
7 James Baumgarner, Sharing of Safety Information Gains Momentum, 347 AvIA-
TION DAILY 4, 5 (2002).
8 Id.
9 NAT'L CIVIL AVIATION REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 4.
1( BaUnmgarner, supra note 7.
INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., PROTECTION OF INFORMATION FROM SAFETY DATA
COLLECTION SYSTEMS, at http: / /www.icao.int/icao/en /assembl/a35 /wp/wp052
en.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
12 Id.
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According to the following statement by ICAO, this trend is det-
rimental to voluntary safety information sharing systems as well
as aviation safety:
Recent years, however, have shown a trend in civil aviation when
dealing with operational errors leading to occurrences, in that
information from accident and incident records and safety data
collection systems has been used for disciplinary and enforce-
ment purposes, as well as admitted as evidence in judicial pro-
ceedings. These proceedings have also resulted in criminal
charges being brought against individuals involved in such occur-
rences. Bringing criminal charges into aviation occurrences re-
sulting from inadvertent operational errors may hinder the
development and free exchange of safety information which is
essential to improve aviation safety, with a potential adverse ef-
fect on it. 3
In an attempt to reverse the trend of member ICAO states
implementing punitive actions against the data sources for these
systems, during its meeting of September 28-October 8, 2004,
the 35th ICAO Assembly passed Resolution A35-17, which states:
Whereas the primary objective of the Organization continues to
be that of ensuring the safety of international civil aviation
worldwide;
Recognizing the importance of the free communication of safety
information amongst the stakeholders of the aviation system;
Recognizing that the protection of safety information from inap-
propriate use is essential to ensure the continued availability of
all relevant safety information, to enable proper and timely pre-
ventive actions to be taken;
Concerned by a trend for safety information to be used for discipli-
nary and enforcement actions, and to be admitted as evidence in
judicial proceedings;
Mindful that the use of safety information for other than safety-
related purposes may inhibit the provision of such information,
with an adverse effect on aviation safety;
Considering that a balance needs to be struck between the need
for the protection of safety information and the need for the
proper administration ofjustice;
Recognizing that technological advances have made possible new
safety data collection, processing and exchange systems, resulting
in multiple sources of safety information that are essential in or-
der to improve aviation safety;
13 Id.
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Noting that existing international laws, as well as national laws
and regulations in many States may not adequately address the
manner in which safety information is protected from inappro-
priate use;
The Assembly:
1. Instructs the Council to develop appropriate legal guidance
that will assist States to enact national laws and regulations to
protect information from all relevant safety data collection and
processing systems, while allowing for the proper administration
of justice in the State;
2. Urges all Contracting States to examine their existing legisla-
tion and adjust as necessary, or enact laws and regulations to pro-
tect information from all relevant safety data collection and
processing systems based, to the extent possible, on the legal gui-
dance developed by ICAO; and
3. Instructs the Council to provide a progress report to the next
ordinary Session of the Assembly on this matter.
14
Against this backdrop of an expanding international consen-
sus for protection of data against punitive uses and disclosure,
what are the major U.S. aviation safety data programs, and to
what extent do they approach the level of protections from sanc-
tions and disclosure envisaged by ICAO? The balance of this
paper attempts to answer these questions. The overall conclu-
sions are:
There is not uniformity or consistency in confidentiality or
protections against sanctions in these programs, although there
has been an evolving trend toward more explicit protections of
the safety data and those who report it;
Sources of protections vary from statutory, to regulatory, to
case law, to administrative policy, to contract, to informal prac-
tice; and
Whether protection is granted in a particular case can be dis-
cretionary, as for example when a judge applies a statutory bal-
ancing test.
This paper describes five current aviation safety programs:
flight data recorders ("FDRs"), cockpit voice recorders
("CVRs"), the Aviation Safety Reporting System ("ASRS"), the
Aviation Safety Action Program ("ASAP"), and the Flight Opera-
14 Protecting Information from Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems in Order
to Improve Aviation Safety, Res. A35-17 (2004), available at http://www.icao.int/
icao/en/assembl/a35/a35-res-prov-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
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tional Quality Assurance Program ("FOQA"). For each, we at-
tempt to answer the following questions:
What are the sources of safety data in the program?
Is the data used for accident or incident investigation?
Is the data used for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
enforcement or civil penalty actions?
Is the data used for company personnel action?
Is the data available for civil litigation?
Is the data available for public media?
Is there any behaviors excluded from protections built into
each program?
In this paper, possible FAA sanctions against individuals or
entities are 'discussed. The FAA may either pursue "certificate
actions," actions to suspend or revoke a certificate or rating is-
sued by the FAA (individual or company) ,15 and/or "civil pen-
alty actions," actions to levy monetary fines.16 Alternatively, the
FAA may pursue "administrative actions," actions that are lim-
ited to a "Warning Notice" or a "Letter of Correction. ' 17 In this
paper, these sanctions are occasionally referred to collectively as
"enforcement actions."
In addition, this paper discusses possible airline company
sanctions against individuals who might compromise safety. We
interchangeably use the terms "company personnel action" and
"disciplinary" action in this regard. However, there are many
gradations within these terms. Suspensions or terminations of
flight crewmembers can probably be agreed to be "personnel
actions" or "disciplinary actions." Less clear are examples such
as being asked to speak with a chief pilot or being required to
take additional training. For the most part, this paper does not
attempt to delineate between all possible gradations of company
action; rather, the major themes of FAA Advisory Circulars and
union contracts are discussed.
At the outset, it should be noted that there are some subjects
raised here that are not covered by statutes, regulations, admin-
istrative or judicial opinions, or publicly available orders, con-
tracts or agreements (collectively referred to as "publicly
available sources"). Therefore, some information about airline
industry practices may be sketchy, although union contracts and
informal contacts with airline industry personnel have provided
15 See 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(b) (2005).
16 See 14 C.F.R. § 13.16 (2005).
17 See 14 C.F.R. § 13.11 (2005).
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some data. In addition, there may be variation of industry prac-
tices among different organizations that are not known to the
authors or their informants."1
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. SAFETY DATA PROGRAMS AND
ISSUES OF SANCTIONS AND DISCLOSURE
Investigating aviation accidents and incidents has been the
province of the federal government since the early days of avia-
tion in the United States. For instance, beginning with the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, it has been the statutory responsibility
of the federal government to investigate aircraft accidents.'" In
1934, Congress amended the Air Commerce Act to require that
the Secretary of Commerce make public the findings of aircraft
accident investigations. 2 °
The purpose of obtaining safety data from any source is to use
those data to look for safety problems and attempt to overcome
those problems proactively to prevent future problems. There-
fore, the availability of and access to data are universally recog-
nized as desirable goals. Certain forms of safety data programs
provide data without human discretion (hence, they are
"mandatory" or "involuntary"). The flight data recorder is an
example. However, there are persuasive arguments that volun-
tary safety programs can provide even better safety data. As has
been noted:
Experience in a number of countries, including the United
States, has shown that a voluntary system requires a trusted third
party to manage the system. The reason is simply that people are
reluctant to report their mistakes to the carrier that employs
them or the government agency that licenses them. In voluntary
systems, confidentiality is usually achieved by de-identification, or
not recording any identifying information. Because of this confi-
dentiality, voluntary systems tend to be more successful than
mandatory systems in collecting human factor-related
information.2
However, both mandatory and voluntary systems often reveal
action or inaction on someone's part that constituted a possible
violation of regulations or an employer's rules or policies.
18 The authors would appreciate hearing from readers about any information
that could be used to correct or augment these sections.
19 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568.
20 ALEXANDER T. WELLS & CLARENCE C. RODRIGUES, COMMERCIAL AVIATION
SAFETY 5 (4th ed. 2004).
21 Id. at 77.
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These situations can lead to a variety of consequences, from in-
ternal company disciplinary action, to FAA action, to court ac-
tion, or public disclosure in a non-legal setting. So, disclosure of
safety data-whether mandatory or voluntary-can have adverse
personal and company consequences. Thus, there is an inevita-
ble tension between the need for data and the concerns of those
who have been involved in situations that generate those data.
This tension has taken many forms, as shown by the history of
these programs and the various types of protections that they
contain.
The infrastructure of entities attempting to improve aviation
safety by having accident and incident data available to those
who can learn from them, versus protecting the reporter from
sanctions or public disclosure, is complex. The following matrix
is offered to help understand what competing interests are at
stake:
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III. U.S. SAFETY DATA PROGRAMS
This section contains a narrative description of the informa-
tion contained in the matrix above:
The Flight Data Recorder. The Civil Aeronautics Board first re-
quired FDRs to be installed on air carrier airplanes weighing
more than 12,500 pounds that operate above 25,000 feet by July
1, 1958Y.2 These crash-protected 5-parameter units recorded on
metal foil the aircraft's heading, altitude, airspeed, vertical ac-
celeration, and time.2 1 The FDR rules were amended in 1972,
1987, 1988, and 1997.24 Currently, for transport category air-
craft manufactured after August 18, 2002, 88 parameters must
be recorded.25
Even after this long history, not all aspects of the permissible
uses of the FDR are well delineated. It is clear that FDRs can be
used for accident investigation, and are a part of National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB) reports. However, the uses of
incidents or other occurrences, plus uses in actions by the FAA,
companies, litigants, and the media, are less clear.
The FDR may be used by airlines for accident and incident
review.2" Concerning FAA uses, FAA Order 2150.3A, the FAA
Compliance and Enforcement Program Handbook, states:
Under Section 13.7 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, the FAA
is authorized to obtain and use flight recorder data in any investi-
gation conducted by FAA since it involves a record required by
the Federal Aviation Regulations to be maintained. The regula-
tion further authorizes the use of flight recorder data in FAA en-
forcement actions since the regulations that require flight
recorders in aircraft do not specifically limit or prohibit such
use.
2 7
FAR 13.7 currently states:
Each record, document and report that the Federal Aviation
Regulations require to be maintained, exhibited or submitted to
the Administrator may be used in any investigation conducted by
the Administrator; and, except to the extent the use may be spe-
22 Dennis R. Grossi, Aviation Recorder Overview, at http://www.ntsb.gov/





21 Interview with Raymond H. Wright, International Flight Operations Man-
ager (Atlantic, Europe, Middle East), United Air Lines (ret.) (Mar. 29, 2004).
27 F.A.A. Order No. 2150.3A (Dec. 14, 1988).
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cifically limited or prohibited by the section which imposes the
requirement, the records, documents and reports may be used in
any civil penalty action, certificate action, or other legal
proceeding. 28
In at least one NTSB appeals case, FDR data was used in a
pilot certificate revocation action in a situation that could be
classified as an "incident. '29 In that case, a deadheading airline
captain riding as a passenger on a company flight reported to
the company that the aircraft had been shaking violently and
that passengers were screaming, crying, and praying during a
portion of the flight, yet the cockpit flight crew made no report
or logbook entry of anything unusual after the flight.3° When
confronted about what happened by company personnel with
the statements of the deadheading captain, the flight crew ini-
tially denied that anything had happened, but then changed
their account to say they had a pressurization problem." How-
ever, flight data recorder data showed that the aircraft had
neared a stall and had lost approximately 7,000 feet of altitude
in 80 seconds, and that the engines had been over-temped 2
The company fired both cockpit flight crew, and the NTSB
affirmed the FAA's revocation of the captain's Airline Transport
Certificate.31 In this case, FDR data was either the primary evi-
dence for the NTSB's decision concerning the revocation of the
captain's ATP, or at the very least, corroborated the report of
the deadheading captain that there were problems on the
flightY4 Although the case does not address the subject, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that FDR data was used by the company as
justification for the firings in this non-accident situation.35
There is also a 1977 court case interpreting language of Fed-
eral Aviation Regulation ("FAR") 121.343 as it existed at the
time (the FAR requiring the installation and use of an FDR for
any turbine-powered aircraft flying above flight level 250). 6
The language of that regulation is nearly identical to the present
28 14 C.F.R. § 13.7 (2004).
29 Garvey v. Carter, NTSB Order No. EA-4765 (1999), available at http://www.







36 United States v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1008, 1009 (10th Cir. 1977).
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FAR 121.343(a)"7 and FAR 121.343(i).3 In that case, the tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a U.S. district court order
for the airline to produce the FDR to the FAA even though no
accident or incident had occurred. 9 The court concluded that
since FAR 121.343 did not contain a specific authorization re-
quiring the release of FDR data for non-accident or non-inci-
dent situations, the FAA was not within its authority to subpoena
FDR data for possible certificate or civil penalty action."'
Unlike statutes and regulations about disclosure of CVR tapes
and transcripts in company personnel actions, in litigation or in
disclosure to the public (discussed shortly), no such statutes or
regulations exist concerning uses of FDR data in these same
contexts. While there may be informal agreements between air-
lines and their pilots not to use FDR data in disciplinary ac-
tions," some pilots' union contracts explicitly state that FDR
data cannot be used as the basis for discipline.42 For example,
the union contract between Alaska Airlines and its pilots states,
"Information obtained from a flight data recorder or cockpit
voice recorder or cockpit video recorder shall not be used as a
basis, in whole or in part, for discipline or discharge action
against a pilot."43 Pilots' union contracts are not uniform on
37 The present wording is: "(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (d),
(e), and (f) of this section, no person may operate a large airplane that is certifi-
cated for operations above 25,000 feet altitude or is turbine-engine powered tin-
less it is equipped with one or more approved flight recorders that record data
from which the following may be determined within the ranges, accuracies, and
recording intervals specified in Appendix B of this part: ... ".14 C.F.R.
§ 121.343(a).
38 At the time, the specific regulation was 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(d). The present
wording of 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(i) is: "i) In the event of an accident or occurrence
that requires immediate notification of the National Transportation Safety Board
under Part 830 of its regulations and that results in termination of the flight, the
certificate holder shall remove the recording media from the airplane and keep
the recorded data required by paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section, as
appropriate, for at least 60 days or for a longer period upon the request of the
Board or the Administrator."
3j Frontier Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d at 1009.
40 Id.
41 Interview with Dean Schwab, Senior Manager, HGS Flight Operations,
Rockwell Collins (Mar. 19, 2004).
42 Agreement between Alaska Airlines, Inc. and the air line pilots in the service
of Alaska Airlines, Inc. as represented by The Air Line Pilots Association Interna-
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this point. The contract between Southwest Airlines and its pi-
lots is not as categorical, stating instead:
Data from Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Re-
corder (FDR) tapes will be used only in the investigation of an
accident/incident, and its contents are to be considered privi-
leged information. Only CVR/FDR data relating directly to a
specific accident or incident which requires the preservation of
such data under FAA or NTSB regulations may be used in disci-
plinary proceedings.44
It also appears that there are some informal policies that com-
panies will not use FDR data in personnel actions against flight
crew if there has been no accident or incident.45
Concerning litigation, at least one case implies that FDR data
are discoverable.46 Companies do not appear to release FDR
data in litigation or to public media. FDR data are part of virtu-
ally every NTSB accident or incident report, and thus become
public in those circumstances.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder. The CVR is an electronic system that
preserves recent cockpit conversation, the captain's and first of-
ficer's radio communications, and public address
announcements.
Following World War II, there was a series of aviation acci-
dents involving cargo hold fires in Douglas DC-6 aircraft, but the
cause of these fires was the subject of conjecture since no FDR
or CVR information existed.47  These events and others
prompted the FAA to require the installation of cockpit voice
recorders on all turbine-powered transport category aircraft op-
erated in air carrier service by July 1, 1966, for all turbine-pow-
ered, and by January 1, 1967, for all pressurized aircraft with
four reciprocating engines.48
It is clear that CVR data are used in FAA and NTSB investiga-
tions of incidents and accidents. Additionally, it is clear that
from the very beginning of the CVR program, regulatory protec-
44Agreement by and between Southwest Airlines Co. and The Southwest Air-
lines Pilots Association for the Period Sept. 1, 1994 through Aug. 31, 2004 at
§ 12.B.5 (Sept. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Southwest Airlines Agreement] (on file with
the author).
45 Schwab, supra note 41.
46 Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 232 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D.N.J. 2002).
47 For a history of the uses and abuses of CVRs, see Van Stewart, "Privileged
Communications"? The Bright Line Rule in the Use of Cockpit Voice Recorder Tapes, 11
COMMLAw CONSPECTS 389 (2003).
48 Grossi, supra note 22.
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tions against enforcement actions were built into the program.
On July 3, 1964, even before any CVR was required to be in-
stalled, FAR 41.212(e) was published.4" It stated, "The Adminis-
trator does not use the record in any civil penalty or certificate
action.' 5 The present wording, in effect as FAR 91.609(g),
states, "The Administrator does not use the cockpit voice re-
corder record in any civil penalty or certificate action. 5
1
Whether CVR data could be used in company actions was a
debate from the beginning. As early as 1969, "the Executive
Board of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which repre-
sented the majority of airline pilots in the United States at the
time, endorsed the use of CVRs, with the proviso that their use
be limited to accident investigations. '5' At the same time, ALPA
continued to reaffirm "its long-standing position in opposition
to the use of aircraft crash recorders and cockpit voice recorders
for purposes other than accident investigation."53
In addition, some union contracts specifically forbid the use
of the CVRs for discipline.5 4 As noted above, Alaska Air's con-
tract states unequivocally that CVR data shall not be used;5
5
Southwest's contract is not quite so absolute.5"
Whether CVR data could be used in civil litigation or by pub-
lic media also was an issue shortly after the rules were enacted
requiring the installation of CVRs. The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act ("FOIA") was enacted in 1966, the same year the first
rule regarding installation of CVRs became effective. 57 The
thrust of the FOIA is that the federal government shall release
information to the public upon request, unless the information
fits within one or more of nine "exemptions" to the requirement
to release the information. 58 The most commonly cited exemp-
tion used to resist disclosure of CVR data is the third exemption,
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 This identical wording appears in 14 C.F.R. § 9 1.60 9 (g) (2004) and 14
C.F.R. § 121.359(h).
52 AIR LINE P .oTs Assoc., INr'L, AI)MINISTRATIVE MANUAL § 80 - Engineering
and Air Safety, 80-71 (Oct. 2001), cited in Stewart, supra note 47, at 396.
53 Id.
-4 Id.
55 Alaska Airlines Agreement, supra note 42.
56 Southwest Airlines Agreement, supra note 44.
57 5 U.S.C. § 551 el seq. (2000) (first codified at Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
(1966)).
5- 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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which states that disclosure shall not occur if disclosure is "spe-
cifically exempted from disclosure by statute. '"59
In the early years of CVRs, transcripts of CVR tapes began to
be appear indiscriminately in news accounts of accidents, often
with no bearing on causes of the accident, with the result that
there were unwarranted and unfair accusations made against
those involved in the accident. 60 As a result, in 1982, Congress
began to enact legislation restricting the public dissemination of
the recording and transcript.6
In its present form, that statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) states:
(1) The Board may not disclose publicly any part of a cockpit
voice or video recorder recording or transcript of oral communi-
cations by and between flight crew members and ground stations
related to an accident or incident investigated by the Board.
However, the Board shall make public any part of a transcript or
any written depiction of visual information the Board decides is
relevant to the accident or incident-
(A) if the Board holds a public hearing on the accident or inci-
dent, at the time of the hearing; or
(B) if the Board does not hold a public hearing, at the time a
majority of the other factual reports on the accident or incident
are placed in the public docket.
(2) This subsection does not prevent the Board from referring at
any time to cockpit voice or video recorder information in mak-
ing safety recommendations.62
In a case involving an earlier version of 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (a
version containing the prohibition against releasing the CVR
tape itself, as the present statute does), a U.S. federal district
judge concluded that the tape should not be released because
the third exemption to the FOIA applied 63 (disclosure shall not
occur if disclosure is "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute").64 That case arose from the crash of a Boeing 737,
United Airlines Flight 585, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on
March 3, 1991.65 In that suit, a relative of a victim of crash
59 Id. § 552 (b) (3).
60 James W. Johnson, Cockpit Voice Recorder: Solely For Accident Investigations, Liti-
gation in Aviation, A.B.A. SEC. TORT & INS. P, AC. & DIV. FOR PROF. EDUC., C at 3
(1991), cited in Stewart, supra note 47, at 395.
61 Pub. L. No. 97-309, 96 Stat. 1453 (1982).
62 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2000).
63 McGilvra v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 840 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Colo. 1993).
64 Id. at 101 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (2000)).
65 Id.
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sought to obtain a copy of the recording itself, not just a tran-
script, asserting that the recording itself was necessary for acci-
dent reconstruction. "
In 1994, Congress passed a statute that gave guidance to
courts that had to deal with a discovery request in litigation for a
CVR recording, and for parts of the CVR transcript that were
not released by the NTSB. That year, Congress added the follow-
ing provisions to the statute dealing with the NTSB's duties and
responsibilities. 49 U.S.C. § 1154 states:
a) Transcripts and recordings.
(1) Except as provided by this subsection, a party in a judicial
proceeding may not use discovery to obtain-
(A) any part of a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder transcript
that the National Transportation Safety Board has not made
available to the public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this
title; and
(B) a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording.
(2) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (4) (A) of this subsec-
tion, a court may allow discovery by a party of a cockpit or surface
vehicle recorder transcript if, after an in camera review of the
transcript, the court decides that-
(i) the part of the transcript made available to the public inder
section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title does not provide the party
with sufficient information for the party to receive a fair trial; and
(ii) discovery of additional parts of the transcript is necessary to
provide the party with sufficient information for the party to re-
ceive a fair trial.
(B) A court may allow discovery, or require production for an in
camera review, of a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder transcript
that the Board has not made available under section 1114(c) or
1114(d) of this title only if the cockpit or surface vehicle re-
corder recording is not available.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4) (A) of this subsection, a
court may allow discovery by a party of a cockpit or surface vehi-
cle recorder recording if, after an in camera review of the record-
ing, the court decides that-
(A) the parts of the transcript made available to the public inder
section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title and to the party through
discovery under paragraph (2) of this subsection do not provide
(6Id.
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the party with sufficient information for the party to receive a fair
trial; and
(B) discovery of the cockpit or surface vehicle recorder record-
ing is necessary to provide the party with sufficient information
for the party to receive a fair trial.
(4) (A) When a court allows discovery in ajudicial proceeding of
a part of a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder transcript not
made available to the public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of
this title or a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording, the
court shall issue a protective order-
(i) to limit the use of the part of the transcript or the recording
to the judicial proceeding; and
(ii) to prohibit dissemination of the part of the transcript or the
recording to any person that does not need access to the part of
the transcript or the recording for the proceeding.
(B) A court may allow a part of a cockpit or surface vehicle re-
corder transcript not made available to the public under section
1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title or a cockpit or surface vehicle
recorder recording to be admitted into evidence in a judicial
proceeding, only if the court places the part of the transcript or
the recording under seal to prevent the use of the part of the
transcript or the recording for purposes other than for the
proceeding.
(5) This subsection does not prevent the Board from referring at
any time to cockpit or surface vehicle recorder information in
making safety recommendations.6
7
In applying this statute, courts have reached opposite conclu-
sions about the discoverability of CVR recordings. In litigation
following the crash on takeoff of a Singapore Airlines Boeing
747 at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport in Taipei, Taiwan
on October 31, 2000, a U.S. federal magistrate judge denied the
plaintiffs' request for a copy of the CVR tape, concluding that
"plaintiffs have made no attempt to demonstrate that the publi-
cally [sic] released transcript of the CVR, Amended Joint Stip.,
Exh. 3, is insufficient for them to receive a fair trial."6
In contrast, the same U.S. federal magistrate judge reached
the opposite conclusion in a case involving litigation from the
landing overrun accident of a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 at
57 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)-(5) (2000). This statute was added after the McGil-
vra case. McGilvra, 840 F. Supp at 100.
68 In reAir Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
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Burbank, California on March 5, 2000.69 Subject to a "protective
order" limiting the use of the tape to the litigation only, the
magistrate judge noted that the plaintiffs had argued persua-
sively that the transcript of the CVR would not be adequate,
given that the transcript had been produced by a group of per-
sons" . . . listening to the tape at the behest of the NTSB", and
that group transcript could be faulty.7 0 The magistrate judge
further agreed with the plaintiffs argument that 51 words were
missing and 11 "expletives" were deleted from the NTSB tran-
script. 71 She also pointed out that ". . .the [transcript] fails to
reflect changes in voice tone, tempo, volume and inflection, all
of which are important. ' 72 Finally, she stated ". . . the [tran-
script] does not accurately reflect the noises heard in the cock-
pit during the recording, and such noises can help an expert
recreate exactly what happened in the cockpit. 73
Note that these statutes and cases specifically deal with the
NTSB's responsibilities for the CVR recording. These two stat-
utes do not restrict other government agencies, as well as air-
lines (who are the owners of the CVR tapes), from allowing
others to hear the tapes. For instance, amid some controversy,
the FBI, which was in charge of the investigation of the crash of
United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed on September 11, 2001
in Pennsylvania, played the CVR tape twice on April 18, 2002 in
closed sessions, once for the relatives of the flight crew and once
for the relatives of the passengers.74 In a strong objection to the
FBI's playing the tape, but without citing any legal authority,
ALPA's President sent letters to Attorney General John Ashcroft
and FBI Director Robert Mueller stating that playing the tape
was "contrary to congressional intent, contrary to precedent,
and contrary to the underlying legal principles justifying the ex-
istence of the CVR.'75
There have been numerous occasions in which CVRs have be-
come public from sources other than the NTSB or a court,
whether by "legitimate" means or not. There are several In-
69 McCoy v. S.W. Airlines Co., 208 F.R.D. 617, 618 (C.D. Cal. 2002).




74 FBI Plays UAL Flight 93 CVR Tapes Over ALPA Objections, at http://www.
alpa.org/alpa/DesktopModules/ViewDocument.aspx?Documentld=337 (last vis-
ited Aug. 30, 2005).
75 Id.
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ternet sites that have portions of several CVR recordings on
them, and apparently none of these recordings have come from
the NTSB. 76 In addition, at least one television program fea-
tures extended portions of the CVR recording of United flight
232, the DC-10 whose engine fan disk exploded, rendering the
aircraft's controls inoperative. The last few seconds of that re-
cording are also available on the Internet. 77
The Aviation Safety Reporting System: ASRS was implemented in
April 1976.78 According to an Advisory Circular originally issued
by the FAA at that time:
The FAA determined that the ASRP effectiveness would be
greatly enhanced if the receipt, processing, and analysis of raw
data were accomplished by NASA rather than by the FAA. This
would ensure the anonymity of the reporter and of all parties
involved in a reported occurrence or incident and, consequently,
increase the flow of information necessary for the effective evalu-
ation of the safety and efficiency of the system.7 9
The program receives, processes, and analyzes reports from
pilots, air traffic controllers, and others concerning aviation in-
cidents in U.S. airspace. Since its inception, the FAA has taken
the position that filing an ASRS report demonstrates a "con-
structive attitude" about safety matters, and although a violation
of regulation might be investigated and established, there will
be no enforcement of a punishment (suspension or revocation
of a medical or certificate, or monetary fine) as long as a report
is mailed to NASA within 10 days of the event.8s The immunity
from punishment is not available if the violation was deliberate,
if there was a criminal offense committed, if there was an acci-
dent, if the incident disclosed a lack of qualification or compe-
76 See, e.g., Cockpit Voice Recorders: ATC Tapes, at http://www.airdisaster.
com/cvr/atcwav.shtml (lasted visited Aug. 30, 2005); Last Words.. .Cockpit Voice
Recordings, Transcripts/Air Traffic Control Tapes, at http://www.planecrash
info.com/lastwords.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
77 United Flight 232 Audio Download, at http://www.airdisaster.com/down
load2/ua1232.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
78 See http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
79 Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular No. 0046D, at 3(b) (Feb.
26, 1997), available at http://www.airweb.faa.gov/RegulatoryandGuidance_
Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/64358057433fe 192862569e7006da716/$FILE/
ACOO-46D.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
80 Aviation Safety Reporting System Program Overview 8 (2003), at http://asrs.
arc.nasa.gov/briefing/PDFFiles/program-briefing.pdf (last visited Aug. 30,
2005).
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tency, or if the person has been found to have committed
another violation within five years preceding the event."
This immunity was first codified as FAR 91.57 in 1979.12 It is
nearly identical to the present FAR 91.25, which states, "The Ad-
ministrator of the FAA will not use reports submitted to the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (or information derived therefrom) in
any enforcement action except information concerning acci-
dents or criminal offenses which are wholly excluded from the
program."8" Thus, the role of ASRS is clear in FAA disciplinary
actions.
Nothing in the ASRS program speaks directly to the subject of
company disciplinary actions against flight crewmembers. How-
ever, industry practice appears to be that airlines have a "no
jeopardy" review process, aimed at understanding how to allevi-
ate system problems that are uncovered. Moreover, if the com-
pany feels disciplinary action is necessary, there are other
sources of data that can serve as the basis for personnel action. 4
Another view is that an airline may simply ignore whether an
ASRS form has been filed as it reviews a safety-related event and
will require corrective action, such as retraining, without regard
to whether a form has been filed.8 "
There is no role for ASRS data in civil litigation or in public
disclosure, other than the program's own reports such as
"Callback" and "Directline."' I This is because information re-
tained by NASA is de-identified; the top of the form containing
the identifying information of the sender is returned to the
sender with no copy attached to the form itself. Thus, NASA
cannot provide any individual data for litigation or media use.
ASRS is clearly a widely recognized and widely used program.
Between the program's beginning on April 1, 1976 and Decem-
ber 31, 2003, there were 605,133 ASRS reports filed. 7 The pro-
gram's website states that there has never been a case of breach
81 Id.
82 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.57 (2000).
81 14 C.F.R. § 91.25.
s4 Dean Schwab, supra note 40.
85 Raymond H. Wright, supra note 26.
116 See Aviation Safety Reporting System Program Publications, available at
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications nf.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
87 Aviation Safety Reporting System Program Overview, supra note 78.
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of confidentiality in the more than twenty years that NASA has
administered the program.""
The Aviation Safety Action Program: ASAP is an information pro-
gram described as a partnership between the FAA, an airline,
and possible third parties such as labor unions.89 During the
early 1990's, several demonstration programs between airlines
and the FAA were conducted, with American Airlines instituting
its program in 1994.90 The FAA issued an Advisory Circular on
the subject in January 1997, and as of February 2005, there are
forty-four ASAP programs in place.91
Part 121 airlines and Part 145 repair stations are not required
to implement ASAP programs. If a program is created and ac-
cepted by the FAA, as indicated by the appropriate FAA signa-
ture, it provides a mechanism for employees to submit safety-
related reports to an Event Review Committee, consisting of rep-
resentatives from each party to the ASAP agreement. If a timely
filed voluntary report is the only source of data about the safety
concern, the FAA will close the case with "no action." If the
report is not the only source of information about the event, the
FAA will take no more than "administrative" action against
someone violating an FAR: a Letter of Correction or a Warning
Notice. Regardless of whether the report is the only source of
data, neither the ASAP report nor its contents can be used to
initiate or support company disciplinary action.
In order for the employee to benefit from these provisions of
an ASAP program, the regulatory violation must appear to have
been inadvertent, not appear to involve an intentional disregard
for safety, criminal activity, substance abuse, controlled sub-
stances, alcohol, or intentional falsification of records.92 How-
ever, an ASAP program requires that the company take
"corrective action" if the ASAP report discloses a "lack of qualifi-
cation" of the individual who files it. In this or other circum-
stances in which the Event Review Committee believes
88 Id.
89 See Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular No. 120-66B
(Nov. 15, 2002), available at http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory-and-
Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/O/61C319D7A04907A886256C790064
8358?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
90 Human Performance Group Chairman's Factual Report at 9 (Nov. 10,
1999), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2000/aa1420/Exhibits/AA1420_
14A.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
91 Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 89.
92 Notice of Order Designating ASAP Information as Protected from Public
Disclosure Under 14 CFR Part 193, 68 Fed. Reg. 54767, 54769 (Sept. 18, 2003).
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"corrective action" is necessary, the employee must complete the
corrective action to the satisfaction of all members of the Com-
mittee. If the person fails to complete the corrective action, he
or she can no longer receive the company disciplinary and FAA
enforcement and civil penalty protections of the program.
The FAA has issued FAA Order 8000.82, dated September 3,
2003, which states that an approved ASAP program falls under
the public disclosure protections afforded by FAR 193, and that
the involved individuals agree to it or it is ordered to do so by a
court.93 ASAP information provided to the FAA will not be re-
leased unless the submitting individual agrees to its release, or
unless release is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The genesis of FAR Part 193 was the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996.1' This Act created a new section of
the United States Code, 49 U.S.C. § 40123, which states:
(a) In General.-Notwithstanding any other provision of the law,
neither the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, nor any agency receiving information from the Administra-
tor, shall disclose voluntarily-provided safety or security related
information if the Administrator finds that-
(1) the disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary
provision of that type of information and that the receipt of that
type of information aids in fulfilling the Administrator's safety
and security responsibilities; and
(2) withholding such information from disclosure would be con-
sistent with the Administrator's safety and security
responsibilities.
(b) Regulations.-The Administrator shall issue regulations to
carry out this section.95
On July 26, 1999, the FAA published its proposed version of
FAR Part 193 to implement this statute.96 After public comment,
the rule became effective on June 25, 2001." 7 FAR Part 193, en-
titled "Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information," says
that the FAA will not release information that is safety or secur-
ity related and is provided voluntarily.98 In addition, if the FAA
93 Id. at 54767.
94 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-264, 110 Stat.
3213 (1996) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40123 (2000)).
95 49 U.S.C. § 40123.
96 Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 40472 (July
26, 1999).
91 66 Fed. Reg. 33792 (June 25, 2001).
9- 14 C.F.R. § 193.7(b) (2005).
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receives a subpoena for information, it will not release informa-
tion unless both the person affected and the FAA agree that it
should be released voluntarily, or unless the FAA is ordered to
do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.99 The language of
FAR Part 193.7(f) is:
What if the FAA receives a subpoena for the information I sub-
mit? When the FAA receives a subpoena for information you
have submitted under this part, the FAA contacts you to deter-
mine whether you object to disclosure of the information or you
wish to participate in responding to the subpoena. If both you
and the FAA determine that release of the information is appro-
priate, the information is released. Otherwise, the FAA will not
release information designated as protected under this part un-
less ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.1"'
There has only been one reported court decision in the
United States in which a court was called on to decide whether
to order an airline to release ASAP data in litigation. This case
was before the advent of FAR 193. In the case of In re Air Crash
Near Cali, Colombia on December 20, 1995,101 a U.S. district court
judge recognized American Airlines' claim that its ASAP data
was subject to a "qualified privilege" against disclosure to plain-
tiffs in the litigation.10 2 The judge stated that the plaintiffs
would have to establish a "particularized showing of need and
hardship" in order to obtain the data, a burden that he admit-
ted would be hard for plaintiffs to meet.1 °3 The judge agreed,
however, that if the plaintiffs could come forward with a "per-
suasive showing of need and hardship," the judge would review
the documents privately in camera, and then decide whether
they should be released.1"4 Thus, no disclosure of the ASAP
data was ordered without that review. 105 The importance of this
case, even though it was decided before FAR 193 was promul-
gated, is that it may provide some standards by which judges
may decide whether to order the release of ASAP data to liti-
gants, which is permitted by FAR 193.7(f).
99 14 C.F.R. § 193.7(f).
100 Id.
101 In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. 1529
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
102 Id. at 1530.
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Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program: The FAA instituted
a demonstration program for the FOQA program in 1995.1"6
FOQA is a voluntary program in which aircraft operators (not
limited to FAR Part 121 or 135 airlines) develop programs to use
Digital Flight Data Recorder or "Quick Access Recorder" elec-
tronic information to observe aircraft operations that exceed
pre-set parameters but for which no accident or incident
occurs. 
107
The FOQA program records data on routine flights. Data
may either be stored and downloaded later, or the system may
transmit information about events that are outside preset pa-
rameters to a company receiving station on the ground for im-
mediate investigation."" In the press release announcing the
promulgation of the FOQA regulation, codified as 14 C.F.R.
§ 13.401 and implemented effective October 25, 2001, the FAA
said that demonstration projects had already been used to im-
prove the safety of approaches at more than a dozen airports
worldwide. In addition, the program had been used to docu-
ment unusual autopilot disconnects, ground proximity warning
system warnings, excessive take-off angles, unstable landing ap-
proaches, hard landings, and non-compliance with standard op-
erating procedures. FOQA data has also been used for
monitoring fuel efficiency, enhancing engine condition moni-
toring, noise abatement compliance, rough runway surfaces,
and aircraft structural fatigue." 9 FOQA data allows airlines to
observe entire distributions of parameters (thereby enabling
tracking of shifts in the statistical properties of the distribution
over time). This information is available not only to flight oper-
ations, but also to maintenance and engineering as well.1""
14 C.F.R. § 13.401 states that no operator must create a FOQA
program." However, if one does, the program must be submit-
106 Aviation Safety: U.S. Efforts to Implement Flight Operational Quality Assurance Pro-
grams, FLIGHT SAFE r" DIGEST July-September 1998, at 3, available at http://ww.
flightsafety.org/pubs/fsd 1998.htm.
107 See Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
55042 (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://ww.asy.faa.gov/gain/FOQA_&-
ASAP/FOQAFinalRule.pdf.
108 Wright, supra note 26.
"I" Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Issues Final Rule on
Use of Airline Safety Data (Oct. 30, 2001), at http://www.faa.gov/apa/pr/pr.
cfm?id=1449 (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
110 Interview with Thomas Longridge, Ph.D., Manager, FAA Advanced Qualifi-
cation Program Branch (May 26, 2004).
M 14 C.F.R. § 13.401 (2005).
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ted for approval to the FAA in order for protection from en-
forcement actions to apply. The rule also requires the operator
of an approved program to submit "aggregate" flight data re-
corder data to the FAA as part of the quid pro quo for it and its
employees receiving protection from enforcement actions. 1 2 It
is up to the operator to decide what safety data to collect and
analyze; the FAA does not prescribe what flight parameters must
be studied.
In addition, the rule requires that the operator-not the
FAA-be responsible for determining what corrective action
should be undertaken if data show that there is a safety prob-
lem. The operator is required to inform the FAA of each cor-
rective action that it undertakes based on FOQA data. The
language of the discussion in the final rule implies that "correc-
tive action" may apply to both operators and individuals. How-
ever, when FAR 193 was promulgated as a Final Rule on
October 31, 2001, there was nothing in the rule or the commen-
tary about it concerning whether a company may discipline a
pilot based on FOQA data. This is in contrast to the ASAP pro-
gram, in which the Advisory Circular states that no disciplinary
action can be based on an ASAP report or its data; there is no
such prohibition built into the FOQA programs. 113 However,
disciplinary actions against employees may be disallowed by
union contract. For example, the current contract with Delta
pilots does not allow use of any FOQA data in disciplinary ac-
tion. 1 4 Industry practice may also permit FOQA data to serve as
the basis for company action, retraining at a minimum, if there
is no union contract to prevent it.11 5 In either event, if the FAA
112 For a thorough discussion of how the FAA extended more protections
under the Final Rule than it had proposed in the original Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, see Evan P. Singer, Comment, Recent Developments in Aviation Safety:
Proposals to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate and the Debate Over Data Protection, 67J. AIR
L. & COM. 499 (2002). The original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposed a
distinction between "punitive enforcement" and "remedial enforcement," a con-
cept that the FAA dropped when 14 CFR § 13.401 was enacted. See Flight Opera-
tional Quality Assurance Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 41528 (proposed July 5, 2000).
113 Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program Final Rule, supra note 106.
114 Delta Airlines Working Agreement between Delta Air Lines, Inc. and The
Air Line Pilots in the Service of Delta Air Lines, Inc., as Represented by the Air
Line Pilots Association, International, at p. 249, (June 21, 2001) (on file with the
author). In addition, a separate letter of agreement, at p. 340, also dated June
21, 2001, reiterates that "FOQA program information shall not be used as a basis,
in whole or in part, for discipline or discharge action against pilots, individually
or collectively."
115 Wright, supra note 26.
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determines that the operator is failing to take corrective actions
of safety problems after being notified of those problems by the
FAA, or if there is willful misconduct, willful violation of the reg-
ulations, or other circumstances, the FAA may withdraw ap-
proval of the program, thus terminating enforcement
protection.
Concerning enforcement actions, 14 C.F.R. § 13.401 (e) states:
"Except for criminal or deliberate acts, the Administrator will
not use an operator's FOQA data or aggregate FOQA data in an
enforcement action against that operator or its employees when
such FOQA data or aggregate FOQA data are obtained from a
FOQA program that is approved by the Administrator."'' How-
ever, the FAA states that it will retain the option of conducting
surveillance activities of those areas where FOQA data indicate
safety problems, and that violations discovered during surveil-
lance activities will not be immune from sanction.'"
Finally, 14 C.F.R. § 13.401 (f) states that, "Disclosure of FOQA
data and aggregate FOQA data, if submitted in accordance with
an order designating the information as protected under part
193 of this chapter, will be afforded the nondisclosure protec-
tions of part 193 of this chapter.""'  FAA Order 8000.81, which
became effective April 14, 2003, also extends the protections of
FAR Part 193 to FOQA data.' " As with ASAP, information will
not be released by the FAA unless by consent of the party who
provided it or by a court order.
Discussion
The earliest safety data programs, the FDR and CVR, were
electronic reporting systems that generate data "automatically."
The FDR program, originally instituted in 1958, had no publicly
available restrictions for protections against sanctions by the
FAA or an airline, although there are agreements and union
contracts forbidding the use of FDR data for FAA enforcement
actions. This FDR program still has the least formalized protec-
tions. With the advent of the CVR program in 1966, the precur-
sor to the current FAR 91.25 was already in place, having been
promulgated in 1964. It stated that the FAA would not use CVR
data for enforcement actions. In 1982, Congress began restrict-
ing the disclosure of the CVR tape and transcripts. Congress
16 14 C.F.R. § 13.401(e) (2004).
117 Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program Final Rule, supra note 106.
1- 14 C.F.R. § 13.401(f).
119 68 Fed. Reg. 38594 (June 30, 2003).
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added further clarification of the availability of discovery in civil
litigation in 1994. Thus, the CVR data have more definitive pro-
tections in place than do FDR data.
The ASRS was the first non-automatic reporting system; and
built into its original design in 1975 was a promise of limited
protection from enforcement sanctions. That promise was fur-
ther codified in an FAR in 1979. As with the CVR, from its in-
ception, the ASRS had some protections built in for the person
who might have had a safety problem. However, the program
did not (and to this day does not) explicitly deal with issues of
use by airlines, litigants, or the public media, although it ap-
pears that airlines will either take a non-punitive stance if an
ASRS report is filed, or the airline may ignore the fact that it has
been filed at all.
The FAA worked with several U.S. airlines in the early 1990s
on developing ASAP programs, and the FAA issued an Advisory
Circular about the program in 1997. From its inception, the
ASAP program contained some FAA enforcement protections
and company discipline protections, although some protection
against litigation disclosure and public disclosure was not added
until 2003, when FAA Order 8000.82 was promulgated, placing
the program under the protections of FAR 193, which had been
added in 2001.
The FOQA program, when it was first instituted through a
demonstration program in 1995, did not contain protections
against sanctions. Now, however, the FAA cannot take enforce-
ment action based on FOQA safety data, and an airline is lim-
ited to "corrective action" under the program. Union contracts
can exclude FOQA from the realm of disciplinary action, al-
though airline practice may be for airlines to require retraining
if there is no contract in place forbidding it. The data is pro-
tected against disclosure for litigation and public media pur-
poses by FAA Order 8000.81, issued in 2003, which placed
FOQA under the protections of FAR 193.
The figure on the next page shows when each program be-
gan, and when each statute, regulation, or order became effec-
tive for that program.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
At the outset, we noted that there is an emerging consensus in
favor of more protections for those who report aviation safety
data. After having reviewed the U.S. experience, it can be seen,
first, that there is not uniformity or consistency among these
programs concerning the types of protections that they offer,
although the more recent programs contain more explicit pro-
tections from sanctions and disclosure of data, chiefly by statute,
FAR, and FAA Order. Earlier programs using the FDR, CVR, or
the ASRS program have relied in some measure on informal
agreements and union contracts concerning use of the data.
Second, sources of protections vary, from statutory, to regula-
tory, to case law, to administrative policy, to contractual, to in-
formal practice. This is evident from the matrix presented
above. In addition, although there might be some circum-
stances in which all data except ASRS data might be disclosed, it
is the authors' belief that explicit protections by statute, FAR,
and FAA Order provide more protections to those reporting
safety data than do informal agreements or union contracts. Be-
cause the recent programs of ASAP and FOQA enjoy these more
explicit protections, it is reasonable to believe that programs
that may be implemented in the future, such as the use of video
camera recording in the cockpit, will also contain explicit
protections.
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And third, although there are formal protections in the form
of statutes and regulations, there is still the possibility of disclo-
sure of data from either the NTSB or the FAA in civil litigation.
This is because the statute governing the NTSB data, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1154, contains a balancing test where a court may order re-
lease of a CVR transcript or recording, subject to a protective
order, if necessary for a party to receive a fair trial in a civil ac-
tion.' 20 FAR 193 permits the FAA to release ASAP and FOQA
pursuant to court order. One specific danger this creates is the
possibility that data, once produced via the discovery process,
will become public due to actions of the party who receives the
data. If there is no confidentiality order or protective order,
that data may fall under the general rule of litigation that infor-
mation produced through discovery becomes the property of
the party who receives it, in the absence of an agreement of the
parties or an order of the court.
120 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(3) (2004).
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